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Abstract 
Whilst most studies on the transformation of industrial relations (IR) in Eastern Eu-
rope focus on the common trends, this paper examines variations in IR practices at 
company level. It uses a revised version of the exchange model to analyse the evidence 
from nineteen case studies in Romania. As the exchange model argues that capital and 
labour are involved in a rational exchange, it would be expected that if a negative sum 
game occurs, the rational choice of the actors would be to move towards a zero or 
positive sum game. However, evidence indicates that nine companies investigated 
seem to have a long-term equilibrium with a negative sum game for capital and la-
bour. It is argued that this is able to occur because, in addition to capital and labour, 
the government and, sometimes, the top management are key actors involved in 
complex games that sum to zero. The paper suggests that differences in the power 
relations between these four actors lead to variations in the IR types employed at 
company level within a country. The main contribution of the paper is twofold: 
firstly, it cites original evidence for the diversity of IR practices at company level; sec-
ondly, it operationalises a revised version of the exchange model that could be used in 
further research to explain the variations in IR at the company level in Eastern Eu-
rope. Overall, it aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of variations in IR at 
the company level. 
Zusammenfassung 
Im Gegensatz zur Mehrzahl der Studien über die Transformation der Arbeitsbezie-
hungen in Osteuropa, die sich mit allgemeinen Trends beschäftigen, werden in diesem 
Discussion Paper die Unterschiede in der Praxis der Arbeitsbeziehungen auf Unter-
nehmensebene betrachtet. Als Raster für die Klassifikation von neunzehn rumäni-
schen Unternehmen wird eine überarbeitete Version des Exchange Model entwickelt. 
Dieses Modell argumentiert, dass die Kapital- und die Arbeitnehmerseite rationale 
Tauschpartner in einem Aushandlungsspiel sind. Bei einem sich abzeichnenden Nega-
tivsummenspiel wäre somit davon auszugehen, dass die rationalen Entscheidungen 
der Akteure bewirken, dass sich die Konstellation in Richtung auf ein Nullsummen-
spiel oder ein Positivsummenspiel auflösen wird. In der Praxis jedoch ist bei neun der 
untersuchten Firmen ein langfristiges Gleichgewicht mit einem Negativsummenspiel 
für Kapital und Arbeit festzustellen. Dies wird damit begründet, dass als weitere 
Schlüsselakteure die Regierung und zuweilen auch die Leitung der Unternehmen in 
komplexe Nullsummenspiele eingebunden sind. Die Autorin geht davon aus, dass es 
die Unterschiede in den Machtbeziehungen dieser vier Akteure sind, die zu unter-
schiedlichen „Typen“ von Arbeitsbeziehungen in Unternehmen innerhalb eines Lan-
des führen. Das Discussion Paper trägt auf zweifache Weise zur Diskussion bei: Zum 
einen weist es eine Vielfalt von unterschiedlichen Formen der Arbeitsbeziehungen auf 
Unternehmensebene nach; zum anderen bietet die entwickelte überarbeitete Version 
des Exchange Model einen Ansatzpunkt für die zukünftige Erforschung der Arbeitsbe-
ziehungen in den Unternehmen Osteuropas. 
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1 Introduction 
Industrial relations (IR), referring to values, laws, institutions and practices that gov-
ern employment relationships (Kochan et al. 1984: 4), have been undergoing radical 
changes in Eastern Europe since 1989. The overall goal of the transformation process 
across the region was originally to achieve economic efficiency and democracy, which 
in terms of industrial relations would be (at least theoretically) bargained corporatism 
(Crouch 1993). In spite of a common aim and rather similar challenges determined by 
the collapse of the communist regime and the process of EU integration, evidence 
indicates that the results of the transformation vary across and within Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs) (Kohl/Platzer 2004; Martin/Cristescu-Martin 
2004; Avdagic 2003). However, most studies on the subject refer to the common fea-
tures across CEECs rather then dealing with the differences between them (Kohl/
Platzer 2004; Martin 1999; Casale 1997). In addition, there is very limited case study 
evidence across Eastern Europe, with the extreme case of Romania offering no evi-
dence at all. This paper is an attempt to contribute to a deeper understanding of varia-
tions in IR at the company level based on case study evidence from Romania. It sug-
gests that differences in the power relations between the main IR actors1 at the local 
level lead to variations in the types of industrial relations employed at company level 
within CEECs.  
The study utilises a revised version of Crouch’s (1993) exchange model to explain the 
variations in IR types at company level. The main argument of the exchange model is 
that changes in the power relations between capital and labour, which are involved in 
a rational exchange, result in different types of IR (Crouch 1993). Crouch distin-
guishes four main types of IR systems with the sum game of the exchange between 
capital and labour from zero to various degrees of positive sum game. He argues that 
if a negative sum game occurs, the rational choice of the actors would be to move to-
wards a zero or positive sum game (Crouch 1993: 35). However, evidence2 indicates 
                                                        
I am very grateful for the valuable comments, help and support of several scholars in writing this 
article. I owe special thanks to Sabina Avdagic, Jürgen Beyer, Michael Blauberger, Linda Clarke, 
Colin Crouch, Martin Höpner, Jörn Janssen, Karl Koch, Myung-Joon Park, Wolfgang Streeck, 
Raymund Werle and Cornelia Woll. 
1  In line with Dunlop (1958), IR actors refer to employees and their representatives, employers 
(the term is used to denote owners and shareholders) and their representatives, and the repre-
sentatives of specialised state agencies. In addition, it is argued that the management team 
does not always represent the interests of employers (see Section 5 for details). Thus, top 
management can be a distinctive IR actor from the employer at the company level. 
2 The study is based on 107 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2000–2001 in Romania 
with trade union officers, employers’ association officials and state representatives. In addi-
tion, union officials, shop stewards, human resource managers and employees from 19 com-
panies from different industrial sectors were interviewed. A similar questionnaire was used to 
conduct (one-to-one) interviews with seven officials from national (transectoral) institutions, 
nine officials from the chemical sector and 91 respondents at company level. 
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that, in nine out of the 19 companies investigated in Romania, IR seems to have a 
long-term equilibrium with a negative sum game for capital and labour. It is argued 
that this is able to occur because, in addition to capital and labour, the government 
and, sometimes, the top management are key actors involved in complex games that 
sum to zero. As a result, a new type of IR must be added to those identified by 
Crouch. This type is called ‘subsidisation’ as it was found in companies that received 
long-term subsidises from the state.  
Although the ‘subsidisation’ type of IR is specific to the initial transition period in 
CEECs, it has two main interrelated wider implications. First, it shows that very weak 
labour and capital (shareholders) at company level may be manipulated by the top 
management, which rationally should attempt to further its own interests. Secondly, it 
demonstrates that the state is a key actor in state-subsidised companies. Nevertheless, 
it is argued that the stronger the capital and labour are at company level, the less is the 
scope of the state and the management team to enter into coalitions or conflicts with 
both shareholders and labour to maximise their own interests. Therefore, this study 
broadens Crouch’s exchange model to enable it to explain variations in IR in some 
rather exceptional cases, when capital and labour are very weak and in state-subsi-
dised companies.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explores the general impact of the trans-
formation on industrial relations in CEECs. It argues that, in spite of the fact that vir-
tually all CEECs have aimed at adopting a bargained corporatist model, the types of IR 
vary across and within these countries. Subsequent to a discussion of the current de-
bates in the literature surrounding the types of IR employed in Eastern Europe, the 
third section presents Crouch’s exchange model, which forms the basis for analysing 
the primary data in the forth section. Evidence demonstrates that there is large varia-
tion in the types of IR employed at company level in Romania. As Crouch’s exchange 
model could not explain IR in subsidised companies, the model is revised in Section 5. 
The paper concludes by outlining its main contribution to understanding diversity in 
IR practices in Eastern Europe.  
2  The impact of post-communist transformation on industrial relations  
The strategic choice throughout Eastern Europe in 1989 was to transform the cen-
trally planned economy into a Western type of market economy, including the adap-
tation of Western models of IR. Most visibly, a pluralist legislative framework was 
adopted after 1989, which guaranteed the freedom of association of employees and 
employers, legally recognising their organisations and actions. It eliminated the legal 
obstacles to the conclusion of collective agreements and provided the formal right to 
strike (Casale 1997: 7). Trade unions have generally been better organised than em-
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ployers in CEECs, but frequently employers have had enough power to impose the 
terms and conditions of employment at company level (Pollert 1999; Martin 1999). 
The lack of employers’ associations during the communist era, the ambiguous context 
of transition involving a widespread black labour market and a weak capacity of the 
state to implement legislation made many employers unwilling to organise and to 
conclude collective agreements (Clarke et al. 2003; Lecher/Optenhogel 1995: 403). 
Therefore, labour institutions based on Western models of IR started to develop in 
CEECs.  
The overall aim of the transformation process across Eastern Europe was to improve 
economic performance by creating competitive and efficient market-based economies 
in a context of a democratic system (Rusu 2002: 5; Martin 1999: 1; Casale 1997: 2). In 
order to achieve this goal, virtually all governments supported the development of 
national tripartite bodies (Avdagic 2003; Ost 2000; Vidinova 1997),3 which indicated 
that the desired result of the transformation of the existing labour relations was a type 
of bargained corporatism. Furthermore, international organisations such as the EU, 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) encouraged the development of a bargained corporatist type of IR (Kohl/
Platzer 2004; Pollert 1999). Therefore, there was endogenous and exogenous support 
for a neo-corporatist approach to IR across CEECs. 
However, achieving economic efficiency and democracy proved to be a very difficult 
task. There was an initial catastrophic decline in the industrial output due to the col-
lapse of interregional trade with the disintegration of the Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance, the severe international competition and globalisation which fol-
lowed trade liberalisation and the disruption of established supply chains (Lavigne 
1999; Martin 1999: 35). This led to an economic recession which continued through-
out the 1990s in countries that had no reforms before 1989, such as Romania and 
Bulgaria (Crowley/Ost 2001; Martin 1999). Furthermore, even in countries where 
there was substantial economic growth (e.g. Poland and Hungary), there were far 
fewer people whose living standard increased than those who experienced a decline in 
their real incomes due to inflation, unemployment and a sense of (economic) uncer-
tainty (Crowley/Ost 2001; Martin 1999; Casale 1997). Thus, a large number of em-
ployees did not have a positive outcome, as would be expected in a bargained corpo-
ratist type of IR.  
The literature on the subject consists of rather descriptive accounts of the different 
labour institutions at various levels, either from a comparative perspective (Funk/
Lesch 2004; Galgozi/Mermet 2003; Kohl/Platzer 2003; Lado 2002) or by treating the 
                                                        
3  These were forums for dialogue and consultation between the state and representatives of 
trade union confederations and employers’ associations, principally relating to labour issues 
(Casale 1997). 
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region as one unit (e.g. Martin/Cristescu-Martin 2004, 2002; Draus 2001; Casale 
1997). These studies are very useful for providing general information about current 
developments in IR institutions, but they rarely utilise a theoretical framework to de-
velop their argument and to conceptualise the cause of similarities and/or differences 
in IR. More recently, scholars have started to acknowledge that the types of IR vary 
across and within CEECs, but they still generally focus on the common trends across 
Eastern Europe (e.g. Kohl/Platzer 2004; Martin/Cristescu-Martin 2004). In addition, 
there is very limited evidence on industrial relations at company level across Eastern 
Europe. Therefore, the existing studies have not thoroughly addressed the fundamen-
tal question of whether and why a variety of IR types are operating across and within 
CEECs.  
3  Explaining diversity in industrial relations at company level in CEECs 
Current debates 
Determinism versus voluntarism 
Most research on the subject indicates the emerging systems of IR in CEECs are 
shaped by both domestic and international factors. Internally, the main elements that 
influence the development of IR in CEECs are considered to be the historical legacies, 
the political and economic contexts, the ideology and social values, and the power 
relations between the IR actors, while externally they are the EU, the ILO, the IMF, the 
World Bank, foreign direct investment and the globalisation process (Kohl/Platzer 
2004; Pollert 1999; Casale 1997). However, there is no agreement on the key factors 
that determine the types of IR emerging in CEECs. Casale (1997: 13) and Petkov (in 
Aro/Repo 1997: xiv) argue that the national actors play a secondary and complemen-
tary role, while the centre of decision-making rests with international financial insti-
tutions. Other scholars consider that national institutions have primarily shaped the 
development of IR since 1989 (Crowley 2004; Kohl et al. 2000; Pollert 1999), whilst 
others acknowledge that IR actors have also had a major role in the transformation 
process (Martin/Cristescu-Martin 2004; Vikerstaff/Thirkell 2000; Vidinova 1997). 
Thus, there is still a controversy among scholars about how much room for manoeu-
vre the national actors have. 
The disagreement over the degree of freedom of action enjoyed by the IR actors could 
be seen in terms of determinism or voluntarism (Huzzard 2004: 24). Dunlop (1958) is 
the most prominent advocate of a deterministic view in IR. In his systemic approach 
to IR, Dunlop (1958) argues that contextual factors, such as technology and market 
forces, along with regulatory factors, ideology and power in the society determine the 
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type of IR employed at any specific level. Thus, a deterministic view that the discretion 
of IR actors is tightly constrained by contextual factors in Eastern Europe, such as 
international financial institutions, national institutions and historical legacies, is in 
line with Dunlop’s (1958) systemic approach. Although Dunlop’s deterministic view 
might be valid in a stable IR system, there is a widespread view that it does not explain 
the transformation of IR even in mature IR systems, such as in the US. Kochan et al. 
(1984: 20–21) demonstrate that IR practices and outcomes are shaped not only by the 
environmental forces, as Dunlop’s (1958) system framework indicates, but also by the 
strategic choices and values of managers, trade union leaders, workers and public pol-
icy.  
Have IR actors had an influence during the radical transformation of labour relations 
in Eastern Europe since 1989? As the existing labour institutions became obsolete in 
the context of the political and economic changes that occurred in Eastern Europe 
(see Clarke et al. 2003), the IR actors had to make choices to restructure or establish 
new labour institutions post 1989. After 15 years of change in CEECs, labour institu-
tions are not well consolidated, IR is generally decentralised and the governments are 
often unable to enforce the labour legislation (Martin/Cristescu-Martin 2004; Trif/
Koch 2004: 195; Clarke et al. 2003). Thus, IR actors at the company level play a major 
role in determining the type of IR operating in practice (Kohl/Platzer 2004; Trif 2000; 
Pollert 1999; Aro/Repo 1997). In this study it is considered that IR actors have a de-
gree of discretions in making decisions about the type of IR employed in their com-
pany. Therefore, this paper supports a voluntarist view, while it is acknowledged IR 
actors’ decisions are constrained to various degrees by both the external environment 
and their own power resources, structures and values.  
Corporatist, Anglo-Saxon or a distinctive type of IR in CEECs? 
Scholars have used the existing IR theoretical models to explicate the emerging IR 
systems. There are three main views concerning the types of IR employed in Eastern 
Europe: 
– One group of authors considers that a corporatist model has been developing in 
CEECs (e.g. Iankova/Turner 2004; Iankova 1997; Vidinova 1997). They argue 
that the national tripartite institutions established at the beginning of the 1990s 
across CEECs helped to achieve a broad consensus on market reforms while 
maintaining social peace. However, a more widespread view is that tripartite in-
stitutions are just a corporatist façade used by the governments primarily to le-
gitimise their policies already decided and frequently rooted in neo-liberal mar-
ket principles (Ost 2000; Pollert 1999; Tatur 1995). A co-ordinated national cor-
poratist approach to IR would be expected to result in rather limited diversity of 
the types of IR employed at company level within a country. 
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– The second view is that IR in CEECs resembles the Anglo-Saxon model (e.g. 
Crowley 2004: 394; Funk/Lesch 2004; Meardi 1996). The authors argue that the 
emerging systems are very decentralised and fragmented, while institutions such 
as tripartism or works councils play a very limited role in these countries (Funk/
Lesch 2004). However, they do not explain the high degree of state intervention 
in IR, which is an essential feature of the labour relations in CEECs, though 
hardly a characteristic of the voluntaristic tradition of the Anglo-Saxon model. 
An Anglo-Saxon model of IR suggests that IR types employed at company level 
may vary depending mainly on the choices of the local IR actors. 
– The third view is that a distinctive type of IR is emerging in CEECs (e.g. Kohl/
Platzer 2004, 2003; Dörrenbächer et al. 2000). Kohl/Platzer (2003: 26) argue 
that, although labour relations in CEECs have been geared towards Western 
European models of IR, a unique labour relations model is emerging in Eastern 
Europe. It shares decentralisation with the Anglo-Saxon model and high state in-
tervention with France in particular. The authors also indicate that CEECs face 
similar demands as a result of fundamental structural change, but that widely dif-
ferent solutions have been adopted within a certain range. Consequently, there is 
some scope for variation in the types of IR employed at company level if the dis-
tinctive type of IR identified by Kohl/Platzer (2004) is actually emerging in 
CEECs.  
Although there is no agreement among these authors on the emerging type of IR in 
CEECs, virtually all of them4 focus on the common characteristics rather than recog-
nising as a fundamental issue the fact that a variety of types IR are operating across 
and within CEECs.  
Exchange model 
A recent theoretical model that covers a wide spectrum of possible types of IR (includ-
ing the three types discussed above) is Crouch’s exchange model (1993). It has as a 
focal point changes in the power relationship between organised labour and capital 
which are involved in a rational exchange or choice. Taking into account primarily the 
exchange relationship between labour and capital, Crouch (1993) distinguishes four 
types of IR systems, as follows: 
– contestation refers to an unformed relationship between labour and capital, 
where a change to the benefit of one party can be achieved only through the dis-
                                                        
4  There is an article written by Kohl/Lecher/Platzer (2000) that emphasises the differences 
between four CEECs. They explain the IR variation in terms of path-dependency, but they do 
not operationalise the concept. 
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advantage of the other and the result of the exchange between them is a zero sum 
game; 
– pluralist bargaining refers to an established relationship between labour and capi-
tal where the exchange relation between labour and capital leads to the develop-
ment of a minor substantive positive sum; 
– bargained corporatism refers to a bipartite relationship involving organised labour 
and organised capital, which set up the main rules of employment relations at 
national level, seeking to spread the positive sum game over the entire country, 
on the basis of a centralised collective bargaining system; 
– authoritarian corporatism refers to the fact that the end-point of the bargained 
corporatist stage must theoretically be the reduction of all transactions between 
labour and capital to a positive sum game, which implies an identity between 
capital and labour. Crouch (1993: 47) argues that national authoritarian corpora-
tism is a form in which there are rarely positive sum games in practice. However, 
at company level, employers often use a mix of punishing dissidents and encour-
aging feelings of shared interests in the rest of the labour force, particularly in the 
US (Crouch 1993: 48). Human resource management (HRM) is the type of IR at 
company level, where feelings of identity between capital and labour are encour-
aged and a positive outcome for both sides is (at least) claimed.5  
Although the exchange model is based on class conflict and/or co-operation, Crouch 
(1993: 35) indicates, in contrast to the Marxist view, that a revolutionary change of 
the capitalist system is unlikely, because it is less attractive for labour compared to the 
gains that could result from increased interaction. Thus, the rational choice for the 
parties is to extend their co-operation in order to achieve a larger positive sum game. 
The exchange model indicates that a positive sum game is more likely to be achieved 
when both parties are strong and they have a long-term established relationship. 
The exchange model has formed the basis for establishing typologies of IR operating 
in Western Europe (Ebbinghaus/Visser 1997; Crouch 1993) and in Eastern Europe 
(Kohl/Platzer 2004;6 Martin 1998), but it has also been criticised for its limitations in 
explaining capital–labour power relations. Firstly, according to Martin (1992: 21), 
game theory, on which the exchange model is based, assumes that actors act rationally 
within an established set of rules, trying to maximise their gains, but ‘collective bar-
gaining is heavily influenced by subjective orientations of the actors, … the rules of 
the game are not always known … [and] the bargaining process is too complex, and 
too fluid to be confined within a rationalistic game-theoretical framework’. Crouch 
                                                        
5  Crouch (1993: 47–49) acknowledges that there are differences between the authoritarian cor-
poratism imposed by fascist regimes and the type of IR imposed by managers, but he includes 
the two models in the same category as both of them claim a positive outcome based on 
strong shared interests between capital and labour. 
6  Kohl/Platzer (2004: 318) used the IR models identified by Ebbinghaus/Visser (1997). 
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(1993: 20) acknowledges that the choices of the IR actors are constrained by the exist-
ing structures as well as by the actors’ limited knowledge of the likely consequence of 
their actions, but his model indicates the conditions that favour particular choices and 
exchanges. Secondly, Ebbinghaus (2002) criticise Crouch’s exchange model because it 
does not differentiate between ‘Nordic neo-corporatism’, with its centralised and 
strong labour, and ‘Continental neo-corporatism’, with much lower union member-
ship and more politically divided unions. Ebbinghaus/Visser (1997) introduce other 
parameters (e.g. the role of the state, the form of democracy, etc.) to distinguish the 
four main ideal types operating in Western Europe. Thus, the exchange model is com-
monly used by the researchers to categorise the typologies of IR operating at national 
level in Europe, albeit on a sometimes modified basis. However, no study was found 
that operationalises the exchange model for identifying the type of IR operating at 
company level.  
4  Diverse industrial relations types at company level in Romania 
This section analyses the primary data from the Romanian sample using the exchange 
model. Empirical evidence indicates a large variety in the IR types operating in differ-
ent companies in Romania. A contestation type of IR was found in the four newly es-
tablished companies (private small and medium-sized enterprises – SMEs) from the 
Romanian sample. In these companies, the employer unilaterally establishes the terms 
and conditions of employment, the only exception being for some core employees 
who may have an individually negotiated contract (interviewees). In all these organi-
sations, employers do not accept trade unions, collective bargaining and conflict, do 
not delegate much power to the middle management and are able to carry on virtually 
as they please. The type of relations between employer (who in all the cases examined 
was also the general manager) and employees may vary from adversarial to paternalis-
tic, depending on the employer’s preferences and style of management. The evidence 
in Romania confirms studies in other CEECs that indicate that, in the emerging pri-
vate sector, employees are not organised, earnings are highly variable and employ-
ment relations are generally informal, as the terms and conditions of employment are 
determined by the employer (Martin/Cristescu-Martin 2004; Clarke et al. 2003; 
Pollert 1999). Therefore, findings substantiate the exchange model argument that a 
contestation type of IR is likely to be employed in the newly established companies, as 
the parties are at the beginning of their relationship and labour is unlikely to be well or-
ganised. However, the relations between capital and labour are not always adversarial, as 
the employer/top manager may choose a paternalistic approach.  
A pluralist bargaining type of IR was found in five privatised companies (four large 
companies and a medium-sized subsidy of a multinational corporation). In all these 
cases, the actual conditions of employment are established at the company level, even 
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when a sectoral collective agreement exists, such as in the chemical sector.7 Interview-
ees revealed that sometimes neither the labour legislation nor these minimal condi-
tions stipulated in sectoral collective agreements are implemented at company level 
(e.g. the right of pregnant women not to work on night shifts, clauses regarding over-
time). Moreover, there are differences in IR even between highly unionised private 
companies that have a similar size and operate in the same market.8 Respondents re-
vealed that top management had generally a major influence on selecting the ap-
proach to IR in each company investigated, but the IR type employed depended also 
on the power of the trade union(s). There was only one company where a strong trade 
union was the main player that initiated a social partnership at the company level 
prior to privatisation and this has been working well even after privatisation. In line 
with the exchange model argument, case study evidence suggests that IR in the priva-
tised sector depends on the power of the parties involved confirming other studies in 
CEECs (Martin/Cristescu-Martin 2004).  
The third possible type of IR derived from the exchange model is bargained corpora-
tism, which is characterised by centralised collective bargaining and a positive out-
come for labour and capital. None of the 19 companies investigated had a positive 
outcome to the exchange between capital and labour, with the terms and conditions 
of employment established at the national or sectoral level.  
One multinational company had a HRM approach (the fourth possible type),9 with a 
positive outcome for both capital and the workforce. Subsequent to an initial major 
reduction of personnel (from 235 to 65 employees), this company appears to have a 
soft human resource management approach, based on individualised pay (higher 
wages than in nationally owned firms), employee participation, regular training for all 
employees and high commitment of employees. According to the HR manager, this 
approach follows the policy of the parent company. In this case, findings confirm the 
Martin/Cristescu-Martin (2004) argument, indicating that multinational companies 
generally follow their international human resource practices,10 with reduction of 
employment levels, increased flexibility and rather individualised pay systems. 
                                                        
7  In Romania, a sectoral collective agreement can only be concluded by the representative fed-
erations of trade unions and employers’ associations and it should cover all the employees of 
that industrial sector.  
8  For instance, the two large privatised chemical companies investigated had very different types 
of IR, namely one company had chosen a ‘low road’, while the other one ‘the high road’ ap-
proach to IR. 
9  National authoritarian corporatism is not a feasible choice, as all CEECs adopted a labour 
legislation that recognises the conflicting interests of the labour and capital (e.g. the right to 
strike – Aro/Repo 1997).  
10  Respondents reported a rather similar development in IR in a subsidy of a multinational com-
pany in Hungary investigated in 2001 by the author. 
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Nevertheless, in another multinational company investigated, there was no major 
reduction of the personnel and the terms and conditions of employment were estab-
lished through a collective agreement negotiated by the trade union, but wages were 
rather similar to the nationally owned firms, while workplace relations were predomi-
nantly adversarial. In addition, a respondent that worked in two different subsidiaries 
(Romanian workplaces) indicated that in one workplace the relations between em-
ployees and management were far more co-operative, and employees had higher 
wages and better conditions of work than in the other workplace. In that workplace, 
there was more communication and mutual trust between the management and the 
workforce, according to the respondent. Thus, evidence suggests local IR actors can 
make a difference in the type of IR employed at a specific workplace even in the sub-
sidiaries of the same company, depending on power relationships and the degree of 
mutual trust between capital and labour, thereby substantiating the exchange model 
argument.  
Whilst Crouch’s (1993) exchange model explains rather well the IR types employed in 
the ten cases indicated above, it is unable to clarify the IR type employed in nine com-
panies that seem to have had a long-term equilibrium with a negative sum game for 
capital and labour. In these nine companies (four large state-owned enterprises, three 
medium-sized state-owned enterprises and two privatised companies) IR is in a long-
term crisis, as these companies were making losses and their employees had very low 
wages. The six large companies were highly unionised (over 75%), but interviewees 
reported that unions were very weak, as these companies had no profits to share be-
tween capital and labour. Apart from education and railway sector, the terms and 
conditions of employment in these companies were established at the workplace. Re-
spondents indicated that the terms and conditions of employment were very much 
dependent on the willingness of the government in power to subsidise their company 
either directly or by not obliging these companies to pay the debts owed to the state. 
Therefore, findings from the small Romanian sample indicate that IR in many state-
owned enterprises and even privatised companies is in a chronically state as these 
companies have survival problems.  
Although the number of subsidised companies in CEECs has decreased with the con-
solidation of their market-based institutions, there are still subsidised organisations in 
Europe. Martin/Cristescu-Martin (2004) indicate that IR in the budget sector across 
CEECs has been in a continuing crisis since 1989, despite having a privileged position 
during the communist period and a relatively high trade union membership. Addi-
tionally, there are state-subsidised organisations in the public sector in both parts of 
Europe, and even commercial companies sometimes obtain state subsidies when they 
have survival problems (e.g. Alitalia in Italy). Thus, it is important to identify the 
characteristics of the type of IR employed in state-subsidised organisations and the 
possible choices of conflict and co-operation between the IR actors.  
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5 A revised exchange model 
In order to include the IR model found in subsidised companies, it is necessary to 
revise some of the propositions of Crouch’s exchange model.11 Crouch (1993: 35) ar-
gues that if a negative sum game occurs, the rational choice of capital and labour would 
be to move towards a positive sum game. Evidence from the Romanian sample shows 
that frequently top managers in state-owned enterprises have upheld a negative sum 
game of the exchange between capital and labour. In the context of transition, they had 
the rational interest in making the company non-profitable so that they could buy its 
assets cheaply, or they just used the company to serve their own interests (Trif 2000). 
With the removal of the central plan mechanism in 1989, top managers of the state-
owned enterprises were in a very strong position, as virtually no one else had accurate 
information on the existing assets of their company. As a result, industrial corruption 
related to the privatisation process has been a widespread phenomenon in many CEECs 
(Croucher 1998). Furthermore, it is possible in any market economy system for top 
managers to take unfair advantage of both shareholders and labour (as with the well-
known recent cases of Enron and Hollinger International in the US), if they are not 
clearly accountable to the shareholders and labour is not involved in the decision-
making process.  
As can be seen in Figure 1, a negative sum game of the exchange between labour and 
capital (∆ l+∆c<0, where ∆ l<0, ∆c<0) is able to occur in practice.12 Although this 
appears to run counter to the rational choice theory on which the sum game model is 
based, it may be possible for both parties to play a losing game. Sometimes, a third 
party can manipulate them to create advantages for itself (being its rational choice), 
and sometimes a player (such as the government in power as employer) may have 
other interests more important to it (such as getting re-elected) than achieving a posi-
tive outcome in companies where it is the main shareholder. Therefore, in the case of 
a long-term negative sum game between capital and labour, the game is more com-
plex, and overall it is at least a zero sum game for all the parties involved.  
Cases I and II are viable in the long term because they permit capital accumulation, 
while cases III and IV, when the outcome of the exchange is negative for capital, may 
be viable only in the short term. Nevertheless, if the system is subsidised by an exter-
nal source (e.g. the state), a negative outcome for capital may be preserved for a long 
time, as long as it receives a subsidy equal to or higher than its losses from the external 
source. This was the procedure used to maintain operation of the loss-making com-
                                                        
11  No IR model or IR typology that refers to employment relations in subsidised companies was 
found. 
12  Crouch (1993: 32) acknowledges that the sum game of the exchange between labour and capi-
tal can be negative, but he does not consider this case a distinctive type of IR. 
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panies during the communist period in Eastern Europe, and even post 1989, in coun-
tries such as Romania (Dochia 2000: 12).  
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tries such as Romania (Dochia 2000: 12).  
Considering the outcome for labour and capital as well as the main IR actors at com-
pany level, the mechanisms of establishing employment regulations and employee 
participation, five types of IR are identified in the analytical framework (Table 1). 
These types are subsidisation (in non-profitable companies), contestation, pluralist 
bargaining, bargained corporatism and HRM. As indicated in Table 1, nine compa-
nies have a subsidisation type of IR, four contestation, five pluralist bargaining and 
one multinational company has a HRM type within the Romanian sample (see Sec-
tion 4 for further details). Therefore, in order to characterise the IR in subsidised 
                                                        
13  Whilst for capital it could be broadly argued that a positive outcome is when the company is 
profitable and a negative outcome is when the company is making losses, it is more difficult to 
define a positive and a negative outcome for labour. In this paper, a negative outcome for la-
bour is considered when the income provided by the employer does not cover the cost of the 
worker’s basic needs, such as housing and food. The rational choice of workers is to remain in 
this employment relation, because the alternative is generally extremely low unemployment/
social benefits, while the workers still have to pay for their basic needs. 
Figure 1 Exchange model revised 
 Capital interest 
Payoffs of the
exchange13 
Positive Negative 
Positive 
Case I 
Positive sum game  
∆ l+∆c>0,  
where ∆ l>0, ∆c>0 
Case III 
Zero sum game pro labour 
∆ l+∆c=0,  
where ∆ l≥ 0, ∆c ≤0 
Negative 
Case II 
Zero sum game pro capital 
∆ l+< c=0,  
where ∆ l≤ 0, ∆c ≥0 
Case IV 
’Negative’ sum game 
∆ l+∆c<0,  
where ∆ l<0, ∆c<0 
Labour interest  
 Legend: ∆c, ∆ l = shares of capital and labour as defined by Crouch (1993: 32). 
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companies, a new type of IR, referred to as subsidisation, is added to the four types 
identified by Crouch (1993).  
 
Table 1 Types of industrial relations at company level 
 Types 1-5: from a negative to positive sum game for capital and labour 
Parameters 
Subsidisation Contestation 
Pluralist  
bargaining 
Bargained  
corporatism HRM 
 1 2 3 4 5 
State (S)  
intervention  
High Very low, 
in favour of C 
Low,  
in favour of C 
High,  
in favour of L 
Low 
Employers and their 
representatives (C) 
Weak 
organisation 
Unorganised Weak  
organisation 
Organised Unorganised 
Employees and 
their representa-
tives (L) 
Organised (weak) Weak  
organisation 
Organised 
(weak) 
Organised 
 
Unorganised 
Top management 
(TM) intervention 
High Very high (TM = 
employer) 
High Medium Very high 
Mechanism of 
establishing  
employment  
regulations 
Statutory legislation
+ imposed by em-
ployers + collective 
bargaining+ others 
Imposed by  
top managers 
Collective  
and individual 
bargaining 
Collective  
bargaining 
Individual  
bargaining 
Power of  
C vis-à-vis L 
Higher, equal, lower Extremely high Higher Roughly bal-
anced at the 
national level 
Much higher 
Type of relations 
between C&L 
Co-operative and 
adversarial 
Adversarial Co-operative 
and adversarial 
Co-operative 
and adversarial 
Predominantly  
co-operative 
Strategic level(s)  
of interaction 
between C&L 
National transec-
toral and company 
Company Company National  
transectoral or 
sectoral 
Company 
Sum game of 
exchange between 
C&L  
Negative, 0 0  0, Positive Positive, 0 Positive (at 
least allegedly) 
Employee  
participation 
Indirect & direct 
participation (weak) 
No Indirect  
participation 
Indirect & direct 
participation 
Direct  
participation 
Types of IR  
in 19 Romanian 
companies  
4 large SOEs 
3 medium SOEs 
2 privatised  
large firms 
4 new  
(private) SMEs 
4 large priva-
tised companies 
A privatised 
medium MNC 
None A privatised  
SME (MNC) 
Legend: SOEs = state-owned enterprises; MNC = multinational company 
In the cases investigated in Romania, what subsidised companies have in common is 
the fact that they were not profitable for at least three years and the state intervention 
was very high (in supporting them with subsidies). Employees were organised in trade 
unions in the large companies, but the unions were rather weak as there was nothing 
to share between capital and labour. Top managers and/or the main shareholder were 
the power-holders at the company level. The mechanism of establishing the terms and 
conditions of employment varied, but usually it was the management team and/or the 
main shareholder that took the key decisions. Although the initial causes of loss-
making were generally due to structural factors (e.g. interruption of supply and de-
mand chains with the removal of the central plan, increased competition), the power-
holders at the company level had to make strategic decisions as their survival was at 
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risk. Top managers’ choices in state-owned enterprises were frequently to gain as 
much as possible for themselves (not to save the company), while private employers 
often ‘captured’ the state officials, by providing them with bribes in order to exempt 
them from paying their debts towards the state (Dochia 2000; Croucher 1998). The 
government in power had a political interest in keeping particularly the large compa-
nies operating, as these covered numerous voters. In addition, one employer inter-
viewed revealed that the government prefers to even subsidise large private compa-
nies, because it is likely to pay less than the value of unemployment benefits that 
would be needed for the employees of these companies if they became bankrupt. 
Therefore, the choice of power-holders was to involve another actor (the government 
in power) to achieve a positive outcome for themselves, while creating a new constel-
lation of actors with a zero sum game overall.  
Capital and labour are at the centre of IR at company level, but the management team 
as well as the state can also be key actors (see Figure 2). Empirical evidence suggests 
that there can be two interrelated games of three actors that determine changes and 
continuity in industrial relations at company level. The first game is between employ-
ers (shareholders) and their representatives, employees and their representatives, and 
the management team. Whilst in Crouch’s model (1993) it is considered that the 
management team represents the interests of capital, in the revised model it is argued 
that the management team can have its own interests and preferences, and it can be in 
coalition or conflict with both shareholders and employees.14 For instance, sharehold-
ers have a common interest with employees in holding the management team ac-
countable. In line with the main argument of the exchange model, it is argued that weak 
shareholders (those that have limited control over the management team) and weak la-
bour can be manipulated by a strong management team into losing positions at com-
pany level. The rational choice of the management team would be to maximise their 
own interests if they are constrained neither by shareholders nor by employees. Thus, 
the weaker the capital and labour at company level, the more opportunities the man-
agement team has to maximise their own interests. 
The second game is between employers (shareholders) and their representatives, em-
ployees and their representatives, and the state (the government in power). Although 
it is generally recognised that the state is an important actor in IR (Ebbinghaus/Visser 
1997; Kochan et al. 1984; Dunlop 1958), the exchange model does not include it, since 
the model focuses on class conflict and/or co-operation. As indicated in Table 1, the 
role of the state in IR at the company level may vary from very low in a pluralist bar-
                                                        
14  Höpner (2004) has a similar argument, by indicating that there is a variety of conflict and co-
operation between shareholders, management and employees (not just class conflict between 
capital and labour) at the company level. In addition to Höpner’s (2004) model, this study 
specifies the conditions under which the management team can be an independent actor, and 
it presents a second interrelated game between capital, labour and the state. 
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gaining type to high state intervention in bargained corporatism (see also Ebbinghaus/
Visser 1997) or very high in the subsidisation type. In the case of state-subsidised 
companies or loss-making companies, a strong state can choose between declaring a 
company bankrupt (conflict) or subsidising it (co-operation). A weak state may be 
forced by a coalition of capital and labour to subsidise the company,15 or state officials 
may be co-opted (‘state capture’) by capital (Dochia 2000; Croucher 1998). If the sub-
sidies from the state have virtually no costs for the local actors, it will be rational for 
them to maintain the subsidies for as long as possible. Therefore, in the case of state-
subsidised companies, the state becomes a key IR actor that can enter into relations of 
co-operation or conflict with capital and labour.  
The revised exchange model can be used for further research on IR at company level. 
The analytical framework presented in Table 1 could be utilised to organise empirical 
data and to develop the argument. Different from Crouch’s exchange model, the re-
vised model demonstrates that it is not always capital (shareholders) and labour who 
are the main actors engaged in the exchange at the company level. Thus, this study 
broadens Crouch’s exchange model to enable it to explain variations in IR in special 
cases, namely when capital and labour are very weak and in state-subsidised compa-
nies. This represents a first step towards a deeper understanding of diversity in IR 
practices at company level, but further research is necessary to identify the conditions 
under which other possible coalitions and conflicts among the main IR actors are 
likely to occur.  
                                                        
15  This has happened in the energy sector in Romania, according to the respondents.  
Figure 2 Possible coalitions and conflicts in industrial relations at company level
State (S)
Top management (TM)
Employers and their 
representatives (C)
Employees and their 
representatives (L)
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6  Conclusions 
On the whole, this paper has aimed at contributing to a deeper understanding of 
variations in IR at the company level in CEECs. Its main contribution is twofold. 
Firstly, it cites original evidence on the diversity of IR practices at company level in 
Romania. Whilst most studies on the transformation of IR in Eastern Europe have 
focused on the common trends, this paper demonstrates that there is large variation 
in IR types employed at company level even within a country (Romania). Secondly, it 
operationalises a revised version of the exchange model, which can be used in further 
research to explain the variations in IR at the company level in Eastern Europe. It 
identifies a new type of IR named subsidisation, which is likely to be found in state-
subsidised companies.16 Thus, the study has an empirical as well as a theoretical con-
tribution to make towards elucidating variations in IR practices at the company level 
in Eastern Europe.  
In addition, the paper contributes to the broader debate on the emerging types of IR 
in Eastern Europe, by demonstrating which of the three views concerning the types of 
IR employed in Eastern Europe is substantiated by empirical evidence. Firstly, a cor-
poratist approach to IR would be expected to result in rather limited diversity in the 
types of IR employed at company level within a country. Since findings show a large 
variety of types of IR employed at the company level, the evidence does not confirm 
that a predominant corporatist type of IR is operating in Romania. In addition, the 
diversity of IR types at company level found within other CEECs (Martin/Cristescu-
Martin 2004; Clarke et al. 2003; Pollert 1999; Aro/Repo 1997) indicates a very weak 
support for the corporatist view. Secondly, if an Anglo-Saxon model of IR is the 
dominant type in CEECs, variations in IR at company level would be expected to de-
pend on the choices of capital and labour at the company level. Whilst the IR practices 
in ten Romanian companies appear to substantiate this view, the high degree of state 
intervention in IR in nine companies is not in line with the Anglo-Saxon model. Al-
though the state intervention in IR is higher in Romania than in other CEECs where 
the economic reforms are more advanced, it is widely recognised that state interven-
tion in IR is generally higher in CEECs than in Western Europe (Kohl/Platzer 2004; 
Clarke et al. 2003; Pollert 1999). Consequently, the evidence is most compatible with 
the third view, which argues that a distinctive type of IR is emerging in Eastern 
Europe that shares its decentralisation with the Anglo-Saxon model while retaining a 
high level of state intervention. 
The political and economic changes in Eastern Europe caused a radical change in the 
game played by the domestic actors, including IR actors. If one draws an analogy with 
                                                        
16  Although the number of state-subsidised companies has been decreasing particularly in the 
countries that joined the EU, there are still state-subsidised companies to be found, especially 
in former Soviet countries. 
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a football game, it could be considered that before 1989 the referee (the party-state) 
established all the rules of the game in Eastern Europe, deciding the players that could 
be involved, with the outcome for each player depending primarily on the interests of 
the referee. Subsequent to the opening of the economies in 1989, the state lost its ex-
clusive position in establishing the rules of the game and a totally authoritarian game 
disappeared. At the national level, there have been two major choices in terms of the 
type of economy and IR: between a liberal market-economy and Anglo-Saxon model 
of IR (‘American football’) and a co-ordinated market economy and bargained corpo-
ratism (‘European football’). The formal choice across CEECs was the European 
game, but it required players that in Western Europe were developed from the bottom 
up over a very long period of time. The lack of experienced and consolidated players 
in Eastern Europe made the achievement of a neo-corporatist type of IR very difficult, 
particularly in a global context where the free play of market forces rather than social 
values have been promoted (Huzzard et al. 2004). However, the EU represented a key 
external pressure that geared the transformation process in the direction of the Euro-
pean game (Kohl/Platzer 2004). As a result, the formal IR institutions are, by and 
large, based on a neo-corporatist type of IR, but in practice there is a large variety of 
IR types, comprising elements of both the European and the American games. Thus, 
this paper is part of the body of literature that contributes to a deeper understanding 
of the type(s) of market-based economies that are emerging in Eastern Europe. 
22 MPIfG Discussion Paper 05 /3 
References 
Aro, Pekka/Paula Repo, 1997: Trade Union Experiences in Collective Bargaining in Central 
Europe. Budapest: ILO-CEET. 
Avdagic, Sabina, 2003: Accounting for Variations in Trade Union Effectiveness: State–Labour Rela-
tions in East Central Europe. MPIfG Discussion Paper 03/6. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for 
the Study of Societies. 
Casale, Giuseppe, 1997: Recent Trends and Issues in Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern 
Europe. In: John Brady (ed.), Central and Eastern Europe – Industrial Relations and the Market 
Economy. Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 1–13. 
Clarke, Linda/Jan Cremers/Jörn Janssen, 2003: EU Enlargement – Construction Labour Relations as 
a Pilot. London: Reed Business Information. 
Crouch, Colin, 1993: Industrial Relations and European State Traditions. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Croucher, Richard, 1998: Economic Development and Trade Unions in a Transitional Context: The Ro-
manian Case. Discussion Paper 4. London: Labour and Society International. 
Crowley, Stephen, 2004: Explaining Labor Weakness in Post-Communist Europe: Historical Legacies 
and Comparative Perspective. In: East European Politics and Societies 18(3), 394–429. 
Crowley, Stephen/David Ost, 2001: Workers After Workers’ States – Labour and Politics in Postcommu-
nist Eastern Europe. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 
Dochia, Aurelian, 2000: New Private Firm Contribution to Structural Change in the Romanian Econ-
omy. Conference Paper. Romania 2000 – Ten Years of Transition: Past, Present and Future. 
Bucharest. <www.cerope.ro/pub/study12en.htm> 
Dörrenbächer, Christoph, et al., 2000: Transformation and Foreign Direct Investment: Observa-
tions on Path Dependency, Hybridisation, and Model Transfer at the Enterprise Level. In: 
Transfer 6(3), 434–449. 
Draus, Franciszek, 2001: Social Dialogue in the Candidate Countries – Synthesis Report. Study com-
missioned by the European Social Partners ETUC/UNICE–UEAPME/CEEP. Brussels: ETUC. 
Dunlop, John T., 1958: Industrial Relations Systems. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. 
Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, 2002: Exit from Labor – Reforming Early Retirement and Social Partnership in 
Europe, Japan, and the USA. Habilitation Thesis. Cologne: University of Cologne. 
Ebbinghaus, Bernhard/Jelle Visser, 1997: Der Wandel der Arbeitsbeziehungen im westeuropäischen 
Vergleich. In: Stefan Hradil/Stefan Immerfall (eds.), Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften im Ver-
gleich. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 333–376. 
Funk, Lothar/Hagen Lesch, 2004: Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe: Organisational 
Characteristics, Co-determination, and Labour Disputes. Conference Paper. The Industrial Re-
lations in Europe Conference (IREC) 2004, Utrecht, The Netherlands. <www.usg.uu.nl/irec/ 
papers/1_FunkLesch.doc> 
Galgóczi, Béla/Emmanuel Mermet, 2003: Wage Developments in Candidate Countries. In: Trans-
fer 9(1), 50–64.  
Höpner, Martin, 2004: European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox. 
MPIfG Discussion Paper 03/4. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. 
Huzzard, Tony/Denis Gregory/Regan Scott, 2004: Strategic Unionism and Partnership. Hound-
mills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hyman, Richard, 1975: Industrial Relations – A Marxist Introduction. London: The Macmillan 
Press. 
Iankova, Elena A., 1997: Social Partnership after the Cold War: The Transformative Corporatism 
of Eastern Europe. In: John Brady, Central and Eastern Europe – Industrial Relations and the 
Market Economy. Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 37–79. 
Iankova, Elena A. /Lowell Turner, 2004: Building the New Europe: Western and Eastern Roads to 
Social Partnership. In: Industrial Relations Journal 35(1), 76–92. 
Kochan, Thomas A./Robert B. McKersie/Peter Cappelli, 1984: Strategic Choice and Industrial 
Relations Theory. In: Industrial Relations 23(1), 16–39. 
Trif: Diversity in Industrial Relations: Evidence from Romania 23 
Kochan, Thomas A./Harry C. Katz/Robert B. McKersie, 1994: The Transformation of American 
Industrial Relations, 2nd Edition. New York: ILR Press. 
Kohl, Heribert /Wolfgang Lecher/Hans-Wolfgang Platzer, 2000: Transformation, EU Membership 
and Labour Relations in Central and Eastern Europe: Poland – Czech Republic – Hungary – 
Slovenia. In: Transfer 6(3), 399–415. 
Kohl, Heribert/Hans-Wolfgang Platzer, 2003: Labour Relations in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the European Social Model. In: Transfer 9(1), 11–30. 
        , 2004: Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe. Transformation and Integration. A 
Comparison of the Eight New EU Member States. Brussels: ETUI. 
Kollonay-Lehoczky, Csilla, 1997: The Emergence of New Forms of Workers’ Participation in Central 
and East European Countries. In: Raymond Markey/Jacques Monat, Innovative and Employee 
Participation through Works Councils: International Case Studies. Aldershot: Avebury, 169–189. 
Lado, Maria, 2002: Industrial Relations in the Candidate Countries. EIROnline. <www.eiro. 
eurofound.ie/2002/07/feature/TN0207102F.html> 
Lavigne, Marie, 1999: The Economics of Transition – From Socialist Economy to Market Economy, 2nd 
Edition. London: The Macmillan Press. 
Lecher, Wolfgang/Uwe Optenhogel, 1995: Regulated Deregulation – an Option for Central and 
Eastern Europe. In: Transfer 1(3), 393–410. 
Martin, Roderick, 1992: Bargaining Power. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
        , 1998: Industrial Relations in Central and Eastern Europe in the Late 1990s. In: Brian Towers/
Michael Terry, Industrial Relations Journal European Annual Review 1997. London: Blackwell 
Publisher, 173–193. 
        , 1999: Transforming Management in Central and Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Martin, Roderick/Anamaria Cristescu-Martin, 2002: Employment Relations in Central and East-
ern Europe in 2001. In: Industrial Relations Journal 33(5), 523–536. 
        , 2004: Consolidating Segmentation: Post-Socialist Employment Relations in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In: Industrial Relations Journal 35(6), 629–646. 
Meardi, Guglielmo, 1996: Trade Union Consciousness, East and West: A Comparison of Fiat Factories 
in Poland and Italy. In: European Journal of Industrial Relations 2(3), 275–302. 
Ost, David, 2000: Illusory Corporatism in Eastern Europe: Neoliberal Tripartism and Postcommu-
nist Class. In: Politics and Society 28(4), 503–530. 
Pollert, Anna, 1999: Transformation at Work in the New Market Economies of Central Eastern 
Europe. London: Sage. 
Pravda, Alex/Blair A. Ruble, 1986: Trade Union in Communist States. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Rusu, Mariana, 2002: Romania’s Planned Accession to the European Union and the Country’s Trade 
Unions. Dissertation. Cambridge: Cambridge University. 
Stanojevic, Miroslav/Grigor Gradev, 2003: Workers’ Representation at Company Level in CEE 
Countries. In: Transfer 9(1), 31–49. 
Stark, David, 1992: Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East-Central Europe. In: East 
European Politics and Society 6, 17–51. 
Stark, David/László Bruszt, 1998: Postsocialist Pathways – Transforming Politics and Property in East 
Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Thirkell, John E.M./Krastyu Petkov/Sarah Vickerstaff, 1998: The Transformation of Labour Rela-
tions: Restructuring and Privatization in Eastern Europe and Russia. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Traxler, Franz/Martin Behrens, 2002: Collective Bargaining Coverage and Extension Procedures. 
EIROnline. < www.eiro.eurofound.ie/about/2002/12/study/TN0212102S.html> 
Trif, Aurora, 2000: The Transformation of Industrial Relations in Romania at the Micro-level. In: 
South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs 3(4), 139–159. 
        , 2004: The Transfer of a Market Economy Model of Industrial Relations at Plant Level to Eastern 
Europe: Case Study Romania. PhD Thesis. London: London South Bank University. 
24 MPIfG Discussion Paper 05 /3 
Trif, Aurora/Karl Koch, 2004: Romania: Learning to Dance. In: Denis Gregory/Tony Huzzard/
Regan Scott, Strategic Unionism and Partnership – Boxing or Dancing? Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 179–196. 
Vickerstaff, Sarah/John E.M. Thirkell, 2000: Instrumental Rationality and European Integration: 
Transfer or Avoidance of Industrial Relations Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. In: 
European Journal of Industrial Relations 6(2), 237–251. 
Vidinova, Anna, 1997: The Transformation of Industrial Relations in Bulgaria and the Role of the 
State. In: John Brady, Central and Eastern Europe – Industrial Relations and the Market Econ-
omy. Dublin: Oak Tree Press, 79–100. 
 

 Recent Titles in the Publication Series of the MPIfG 
MPIfG Discussion Papers 
DP 05 /2 
B. Ebbinghaus  
Can Path Dependence Explain 
Institutional Change? Two 
Approaches Applied to 
Welfare State Reform 
DP 05 /1 
C. Woll  
Learning to Act on World 
Trade: Preference Formation of 
Large Firms in the United 
States and the European Union 
DP 04 /12 
C. Trampusch 
Sozialpolitik durch Tarifvertrag 
in den Niederlanden: Die Rolle 
der industriellen Beziehungen 
in der Liberalisierung des 
Wohlfahrtsstaates 
DP 04 /11 
P. Manow, S. Burkhart  
Legislative Autolimitation 
under Divided Government: 
Evidence from the German 
Case, 1976–2002 
DP 04 /10 
M. Höpner 
Sozialdemokratie, 
Gewerkschaften und 
organisierter Kapitalismus, 
1880–2002 
MPIfG Working Papers 
WP 05 /3 
C. Trampusch  
Sequenzorientierte Policy-
Analyse: Warum die 
Rentenreform von Walter 
Riester nicht an 
Reformblockaden scheiterte 
WP 05 / 2 
W. Streeck, C. Trampusch 
Economic Reform and the 
Political Economy of the 
German Welfare State 
WP 05 /1 
R. Mayntz, F.W. Scharpf 
Politische Steuerung – Heute? 
WP 04 /6 
F.W. Scharpf  
Legitimationskonzepte jenseits 
des Nationalstaats 
WP 04 /5 
A. Schäfer 
A New Form of Governance? 
Comparing the Open Method 
of Coordination to Multilateral 
Surveillance by the IMF and 
the OECD 
WP 04 /4 
W. Streeck 
Globalisierung: Mythos und 
Wirklichkeit 
MPIfG Books 
W. Streeck, K. Thelen (eds.) 
Beyond Continuity: 
Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies 
Oxford University Press, 2005 
O. Treib  
Die Bedeutung der nationalen 
Parteipolitik für die Umsetzung 
europäischer Sozialrichtlinien 
Campus, 2004 
J. Beckert, J. Eckert, M. Kohli, 
W. Streeck (Hg.) 
Transnationale Solidarität. 
Chancen und Grenzen 
Campus, 2004 
S. Ganghof 
Wer regiert in der 
Steuerpolitik? 
Einkommensteuerreform 
zwischen internationalem 
Wettbewerb und nationalen 
Verteilungskonflikten 
Campus 2004 
H. Enderlein 
Nationale Wirtschaftspolitik 
in der europäischen 
Währungsunion 
Campus 2004 
 
 
Ordering Information 
MPIfG Discussion Papers  
Order printed copies from the MPIfG (you will be 
billed) or download PDF file from the MPIfG web-
site (free). 
MPIfG Working Papers  
Online at the MPIfG website. 
MPIfG Books  
At bookstores; abstracts on the MPIfG website. 
www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de 
Go to Publications. 
New Titles 
Consult our website for the most complete and up-
to-date information about MPIfG publications and 
publications by MPIfG researchers. To sign up for news-
letters and mailings, please go to Service on the 
MPIfG website. Upon request to info@mpi-fg-koeln. 
mpg.de, we will be happy to send you our Recent 
Publications brochure. 
ERPA 
MPIfG Discussion Papers and MPIfG Working Papers 
in the field of European integration research are 
included in the European Research Papers Archive 
(ERPA) which offers full-text search options:  
http://eiop.or.at/erpa. 
 
